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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a case of first impression, involving standards for evaluating and considering 
evidence under the DNA Innocence statute passed by the Idaho Legislature in 2001. 
Zane Fields sought to prove his innocence of capital murder at an evidentiary hearing, 
after a timely filed request for post-conviction relief. Fields proffered evidence to the district 
court that he was excluded as a contributor of male DNA found in fingernail scrapings taken by 
the police from the victim, Mary Vanderford. This DNA evidence was sufficient to preclude 
summary dismissal. 
Mrs. Vanderford was attacked by a lone man in a cramped space behind the counter in the 
Wishing Well store. While struggling with her attacker, she suffered multiple stab wounds and a 
knife cut on her left hand that was "consistent with a defensive wound." When the DNA 
evidence is evaluated in conjunction with the physical evidence of the attack and the description 
by two witnesses of a man in the store who did not look like Fields, there can be no doubt that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary dismissal was error. 
Accordingly, this Court should either reverse the district court and declare Fields innocent 
or remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, after setting the standards for evaluating and 
considering the scope of evidence available under the DNA statute. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INNOCENCE 
The DNA Act passed by the Idaho Legislature controls this case. See Idaho Session 
Laws, ch. 317, pp. 1126-30 (2001) (hereinafter "DNA Act"). The DNA Act is codified in Idaho 
Code sections 19-4901(a)(6), 19-4902(b) through 19-4902(f), and 19-2719(4). Idaho Code 
section 19-4902( d) provides that the DNA testing must produce new non-cumulative evidence 
that shows "it is more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent." If the "DNA test results 
demonstrate, in light of all admissible evidence, that the person is not the person who committed 
the offense, the court shall order appropriate relief" I.C. § 19-4902(e) (emphasis added). 
The standard for "actual innocence" was recently addressed by this Court. Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, _,220 P.3d 1066, 1072 (2009). In Rhoades, this Court stated that a prima 
facie case of "actual innocence" requires that "'the petitioner must show that it is more likely 
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light ofthe new evidence. ", 
/d. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995». 
As the State noted, '''proof beyond a reasonable doubt marks the legal boundary 
between guilt and innocence.'" State's Briefat 10 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328). A 
reasonable, properly instructed juror will not vote to convict if that juror has a reasonable doubt 
as to the defendant's guilt. 
Finally, the standard for establishing innocence is the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, not the clear and convincing standard.) 
III. ALL ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE MUST BE CONSIDERED 
The State argues that this Court may not consider all probative material evidence of 
Fields'innocence. The State contends that State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), 
and Idaho Code section 19-2719(5) limit the evidence that can be evaluated and considered under 
the DNA Act. For the following reasons, the State is wrong. 
See I.e. § 19-4902( d) (more probable than not that the petitioner is innocent); Rhoades, 
220 P.3d at 1072 (more likely than not that reasonable juror would not convict); and Schlup, 513 
U.S. at 327 ("more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
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A. Drapeau Does Not Limit the Admissible Evidence that Must Be Considered 
The Legislature enacted a broad, all-encompassing standard of permissible evidence for 
the evaluation of innocence claims based on DNA analysis. The DNA Act represents a major 
distinction from both the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UP CPA"), I.C. § 19-4901 et 
seq., and the Special Appellate and Post-Conviction Procedure for Capital Cases. I.C. § 19-2719. 
Rather than repeat other statutory limitations or impose diligence requirements (other than timely 
filing of the claim), the Legislature established "all admissible evidence" as the appropriate 
evidentiary standard. Idaho Code § 19-4902 (e). 
In an effort to restrict review of evidence, the State seeks to import the Drapeau newly 
discovered evidence standard into innocence claims governed by the DNA Act. Neither the plain 
language of the DNA Act nor a statutory analysis ofthe language supports this reading. 
The post-conviction statute distinguishes between petitions raising traditional guilt or 
sentencing claims based on new evidence and those raising innocence claims supported by DNA 
testing. Within the class of traditional post-conviction cases, the statute authorizes new evidence 
claims based on "evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires 
vacation of the conviction and sentence in the interest of justice." I.C § 19-4901 (a)(4). The post-
conviction statute was amended in 2001 to authorize a more specific basis for a post-conviction 
claim: "Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902 (b) through (t), Idaho Code, that the 
petitioner is innocent of the offense." See I.e. § 19-4901(a)(6). Thus, the plain language ofthe 
statute draws a distinction between general claims of newly discovered evidence and specific 
claims of innocence premised on DNA testing. See I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4) and 19-4901(a)(6). 
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When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to the 
statutory language as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Jeppesen, 138 
Idaho 71, 74, 57 P.3d 782, 785 (2002). Other than a requirement of timely filing with which 
Fields complied, the Legislature included no procedural limitation on the facts to be considered 
in evaluating innocence claims brought under the DNA Act. Instead, the Legislature provided 
expressly that innocence claims were to be evaluated "in light of all admissible evidence." I.e. § 
19-4902(e) (emphasis added). Given the Legislature's unambiguous statement ofthe broad 
scope of evidence to be considered in proving one's innocence, the only limit on evidence to be 
considered in innocence cases seeking DNA testing is that the evidence be admissible. Section 
19-4902(e) broadly and explicitly empowers the reviewing court to determine whether Fields is 
innocent "in light of all admissible evidence." The State's attempt to limit timely innocence 
claims, by excluding evidence because a particular fact might have been discoverable earlier, is 
contrary to the plain language of the new DNA Act. 
Notwithstanding the DNA Act's plain language, the State seeks to preclude consideration 
of additional new facts that support Fields' DNA innocence claim. The State relies on Drapeau 
and Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24,30,995 P.2d 794, 800 (2000), for the proposition that 
"[p ]resumably ... Fields must establish the evidence meets the four-part test from State v. 
Drapeau." State's Brief at 9. That presumption should be rejected by this Court. 
Neither Drapeau nor Grube involved DNA testing requests or post-conviction claims 
pursuant to sections 19-4901 (a)(6) and 19-4902(b) through (e). Indeed, the new DNA testing 
statute was not passed by the Legislature until 2001, State's Brief at 9 (citing session laws), after 
the decisions in both Drapeau and Grube. The State's importation of the four-part Drapeau test, 
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applicable generally to petitions premised on newly discovered evidence, is not applicable to the 
more specific and limited class of innocence cases - based on the statute's plain language, supra, 
as well as principles of statutory construction and sound reasons of public policy. 
Even ifthere were some ambiguity in the meaning of "all admissible evidence" under 
section 19-4902( e), rules of statutory construction lend further support to the conclusion that the 
Drapeau limitations are inapplicable in evaluating claims ofinnocence under the Act. The 
Legislature is charged with knowing the state of existing law when it passes legislation. Callies 
v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,847,216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). Based on the Legislature'S presumed 
knowledge of Drapeau and Grube, the express provision for review of innocence cases "in light 
of all admissible evidence" is a clear statement oflegislative intent to omit any diligence, 
cumulative or impeaching limitations and to mandate consideration of a broader range of facts 
than might be allowed under Drapeau.2 
The DNA Act does not limit the scope of admissible evidence and does not include a 
diligence requirement that could exclude some otherwise admissible evidence. "We do not 
lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless 
2 While there are some similarities between the Drapeau test for relief based on a general 
claim of newly discovered evidence and the statutory test for a showing of innocence based on 
new DNA evidence under section 19-4901 (a)(6) and 19-4902(b) through(f), important 
differences preclude importing the entire Drapeau test into the innocence analysis under the 
statute. The primary congruity between the innocence standard in section 19-4902( d) and ( e) and 
the standard for a new trial in Drapeau is that a new trial should be ordered if the new evidence 
will probably result in an acquittal. See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691,551 P.2d at 978 ("will 
probably result in an acquittal"); I.C. § 19-4902 (more likely than not that petitioner is innocent); 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at _, 220 P.3d at 1072 (more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 
have convicted in light of the new evidence)( citing Schlup). These standards are essentially the 
same; if it is "more likely than not" that the petitioner is innocent or that a reasonable juror would 
not vote to convict, then a vote of the reasonable juror that considers the new evidence will 
probably result in an acquittal. See supra at 2. 
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intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the 
same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest." Jama v. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335,341 (2005). "[W]hen 'Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section ofthe same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. '" 
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002). 
The Legislature knows how to impose a diligence requirement, as it imposed a strict 
waiver provision limiting the consideration of claims that were known or should or could have 
been known. See I.C. 19-2719(5). Had the Idaho Legislature wished to attach a diligence 
requirement to the evidence considered in evaluating claims of innocence, it could have done so 
explicitly. Accordingly, the Legislature's inclusion of a broader scope of evidence in DNA 
innocence claims constitutes a purposeful exclusion of the Drapeau limitations. 
Further support for the Act's distinction arises from the obvious public policy that timely 
wrongful conviction cases based on claims of innocence should be evaluated closely based on all 
material evidence. As a matter of public policy, particularly when the ultimate punishment of 
death has been imposed, determinations of innocence should be made after considering all 
relevant facts. The "individual interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the context of 
actual innocence. The quintessential miscarriage of justice is the execution of a person who is 
entirely innocent." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-25. Under Schlup a credible innocence claim 
requires "new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial." Id. at 324. 
This Court has declined to bar the consideration of new evidence in support of a previously 
6 
dismissed claim because it "would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of 
actual innocence in successive post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly 
material or had been suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 
647, 8 P.3d 636, 642 (2000)( emphasis added). This Court's reservation in Sivak of the right to 
review clearly material evidence of actual innocence expresses a sound public policy and further 
supports construction of the DNA Act to allow the same. 
Construing the statute in favor of this public policy will not introduce a substantial burden 
on the courts, given the relative rarity of viable actual innocence cases. Substantial claims of 
innocence are "extremely rare." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. There have been only 258 DNA 
exonerations in the entire United States, and only one in Idaho. Innocence Project Case Profiles, 
available online, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/. Given the rarity of viable innocence 
cases and the enormity of the stakes for the unfortunate few who have been convicted despite 
their innocence, the Legislature instructed the courts to review plausible innocence cases "in light 
of all admissible evidence." As presumed under Callies, the Legislature no doubt took to heart 
this Court's concern in Sivak that clearly material evidence should be considered in cases of 
actual innocence: "We must be vigilant against imposing a rule oflaw that will work injustice in 
the name of judicial efficiency." Sivak, 134 Idaho at 647,8 P.3d at 642. 
For similar reasons, other aspects of the Drapeau limitations, that "cumulative or 
impeaching" evidence may not be considered, should likewise be inapplicable to a DNA 
innocence claim. As with a Brady claim, material impeaching evidence is plainly exculpatory. 
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Exculpatory evidence, even ifit is 
exculpatory because it is impeaching, is plainly relevant and material to an actual innocence 
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claim. See, e.g., State v. Presnall, 119 Idaho 207, 208-09,804 P.2d 936,937-38 (1991)(when 
absence of impeaching evidence might have contributed to the conviction, evidence impeaching 
test results was plainly relevant and improperly excluded). When DNA evidence plainly raises 
the likelihood that an innocent person has been convicted and sentenced to death, additional, 
admissible evidence that impeaches witnesses who may have been the source of inculpatory 
evidence is plainly relevant admissible evidence that must be considered under the DNA Act. 
The State contends that cumulative portions of the affidavits offered by Fields cannot be 
considered in this proceeding. To the extent that information in any of Fields' proffered 
affidavits is truly cumulative of statements offired by that same witness at trial, this Court must 
already consider those facts when reviewing this case "in light of all admissible evidence." The 
State characterizes some portions of the Betty Heaton3 and Mari Munk affidavits as 
"regurgitation" oftheir trial testimony. See State's Brief at 23, 25. Consideration of the truly 
cumulative portion of Fields' proffered affidavits is at most harmless, because those facts indeed 
are in the trial transcript and constitute part of the admissible evidence which this Court already 
must consider. Since the facts are scattered throughout a transcript, the organization of the facts 
in the affidavits offers convenience to this Court, and the affidavits should therefore be 
considered in their entirety. 
The State objects to consideration of Jeff Acheson's affidavit on the ground that it is 
cumulative and impeaching. State's Brief at 24-25. However, Acheson's statement, that the 
other inmate "snitch" witnesses admitted making up their stories regarding Fields' alleged 
3 Betty Heaton was Betty Homecker at trial. She is referred to herein as Betty Homecker-
Heaton 
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confessions to them, is not cumulative evidence, notwithstanding its similarity to the testimony 
of Salvador Martinez. Independent testimony from Acheson that the other inmate informants 
Heistand, Bianchi and Gilchrist admitted making up their stories is powerful non-cumulative 
evidence that undercuts the main evidence against Fields, his alleged confessions to the inmate 
snitches. R. Vol. II, p. 275, Certificate of Exhibits (hereinafter "CE"), Ex. 9, Att. D, p. 2. This 
Court has held that testimony to the same facts by different witnesses is not "cumulative" 
evidence. See State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847-48, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (1999). In 
Harris, the State argued that an excluded witness was cumulative, when that witness's testimony 
was identical on the important point made by a witness who testified. This Court held that the 
excluded witness's testimony was not cumulative, because the testimony more strongly 
corroborated the defendant's story by virtue of coming from another witness, directly attacked 
the credibility of the prosecution's main witness, and "reasonably could have affected the 
outcome of the case." !d. 
The State's attempt to preclude this Court from considering material, probative evidence 
that supports Fields' innocence claim should be rejected. 
B. For Similar Reasons, 19-2719 Does Not Limit the Evidence to Be Considered 
The State also argues that Idaho Code section 19-2719 precludes the consideration of 
information that could or should have been known, or is cumulative or impeaching, State's Brief 
at 22-23,25, even ifthat evidence wasn't presented at trial. For much ofthe same reasoning set 
forth above, regarding the inapplicability of Drapeau, supra at 3-9, the State's argument about 
the limitations on the DNA Act arising from section 19-2719 should also be rejected. Several 
additional reasons specific to section 19-2719 also foreclose the State's argument. 
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First, section 19-2719 explicitly provides that the "special procedures for ... forensic 
DNA testing set forth in sections 19-4901(a)(6) and 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho Code, arefully 
applicable in capital cases .... " I.C. § 19-2719(4)(emphasis added). Those applicable procedures 
are discussed above. 
Second, if the State is relying on section 19-2719(3), to preclude the consideration of 
Fields' innocence claim and supporting affidavits, the time limitation was changed by the 
Legislature to revive formerly barred innocence claims and allow claimants like Fields to file by 
July 1, 2002. I.C. § 19-2719(4). Section 19-2719(4) explicitly included a provision that waives 
the general, 42-day, post-conviction filing requirement of section 19-2719(3) for DNA innocence 
cases like this one. Fields timely filed his petition on June 27, 2002. R.7. 
Third, ifthe State is instead relying upon section 19-2719(5) to exclude the affidavits, 
that provision is inapplicable. Section 19-2719(5) only bars claims, not supporting facts. "Ifthe 
defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, 
he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should 
have been known." I.C. § 19-2719(5)(emphasis added). Fields' innocence claim is neither 
barred nor waived. It was timely filed. 
Additionally, sub-sections 19-2719(5)(a), (b), and (c) do not even apply to a timely filed 
post-conviction petition. Those sub-sections apply only to a petitioner seeking a safe harbor for 
an untimely claim via an "exception" to the timeliness requirement. Here, Fields raised the claim 
on time, pursuant to section 19-2719(4). 
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Even if sub-sections 19-2719(5)(a) and (b)4 did apply to Fields' timely filed petition, by 
their terms they do not preclude the consideration of his proffered affidavits. With respect to 
sub-section 19-2719(5)( a), Fields complied with the procedures prescribed therein. His petition 
was supported by a precise statement of the issue asserted and by material facts stated under oath 
or affirmation by credible persons with first hand knowledge. See I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a). In 
supporting his DNA petition with a detailed description of material facts and with proffered 
affidavits by credible persons with personal knowledge, Fields complied with the "procedures set 
forth in this section." I.C. § 19-2719(4). 
Sub-section 19-2719(5)(b) states that a petition seeking the exception is "facially 
insufficient" to the extent it alleges matters that are "cumulative or impeaching" or would not 
"cast doubt on the reliability ofthe conviction or sentence." I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b). For the same 
reason that specific directives of the DNA Act control over more general provisions of the 
UPCPA, supra at 3-6, the general objection to "cumulative or impeaching" evidence in section 
19-2719 must fall to the more specific directive ofthe DNA Act that the determination of Fields' 
innocence be made "in light of all admissible evidence." Section 19-2719(4) enforces that 
prescription by stating that the new DNA provisions are "fully applicable in capital cases." 
Moreover, the allegations in Fields' proffered affidavits "cast doubt on the reliability ofthe 
conviction or sentence." See I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b). If definitions of "cumulative or impeaching" 
were framed so as to preclude "admissible evidence" and foreclose the consideration of 
probative, material information that "cast[ s] doubt on the reliability of the conviction or 
4 Sub-section 19-2719(5)( c) prohibits petitions seeking retroactive application of new rules 
of law. This provision is not implicated by this case. 
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sentence," the statute would be "palpably absurd." See Jeppesen, 138 Idaho at 74, 57 P.3d at 785. 
Such a contorted construction cannot stand. 
Accordingly, based on the plain language of the statute, rules of statutory construction 
and sound public policy, Fields' proffered affidavits from witnesses Hornecker-Heaton, Munk 
and Acheson contain admissible material evidence which must be considered in evaluating 
Fields' claim of innocence under the post-conviction DNA Act. 
IV. FIELDS' DNA TEST RESULTS AND WITNESS AFFIDA VITS MADE A 
POWERFUL CASE OF INNOCENCE WITH NEW MATERIAL EVIDENCE 
THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TESTED AT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Fields has proffered DNA test results and sworn affidavits that offer admissible evidence 
of his innocence. The State concedes the case against Fields was "not overwhelming," but 
argues that "compelling" evidence supports the conviction. State's Brief at 11-12. For the 
reasons set forth in Fields' opening brief and herein, his sworn affidavits strongly support his 
innocence claim. Accordingly, the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether, in light of all admissible evidence, it is more probable than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted Fields. 
A. The Male DNA in the Victim's Fingernail Scrapings Most Likely Came From 
Her Attacker 
The State and district court engaged in faulty logic and accepted a circular fallacy, when 
they concluded, erroneously, that the male DNA found under the victim's fingernails could not 
have come from her attacker because there was no evidence that Fields was scratched. In the 
district court the State invited this error: 
The testing only shows that the petitioner's DNA was not found on the scrapings 
taken from the victim's fingernails. Since there is no evidence that the victim 
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scratched the petitioner, or touched him in such a way that his DNA would get 
under her fingernails, the absence of his DNA, proves nothing. 
R.236.5 The district court adopted this fallacious reasoning in its opinion. "With respect to the 
DNA evidence recovered from the victim's fingernail scrapings, there was no evidence that the 
Petitioner had been scratched." R. 260, Memorandum Decision and Order at 4. 
Indeed, there is no evidence that Fields was scratched, and the State admits as much. 
"There was no evidence that the Defendant had scratch marks on him." R.58. In concluding 
that the fingernail scrapings are irrelevant because there is no evidence that Fields was scratched, 
the State and the district court err. The male DNA under Mrs. Vanderford's nails establishes that 
she scratched someone, and the tests exclude Fields. That Fields was not scratched only adds to 
the proof of his innocence. 
The DNA and forensic evidence supports the reasonable inference of innocence because 
male DNA from someone other than Fields was found under the victim's fingernails. The State's 
attempts to explain away that DNA are not persuasive. 
The State concedes that its pathologist, Dr. Frank Roberts, characterized a cut on Mrs. 
Vanderford's finger as a "defensive wound." State's Brief at 13. Dr. Roberts described the cut 
and explained that: 
This was a linear injury on the top of the ring finger .... I described it as a defense 
wound. Sometimes when people are being attacked they put their hands up to 
defend themselves, and this appeared to be consistent with a defense wound. 
5 See also State's Brief at 18 (nothing about the defense wound "establish[ es] Fields' DNA 
should be underneath Mary's fingernails. At best, the testimony establishes the knife Fields used 
touched Mary's hand, not that her fingernails scratched his skin."). 
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T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1063. The inference drawn from this evidence is that Mrs. Vanderford was 
defending herself. While attempting to fend offknife thrusts and deter her attacker, she likely 
scratched or grabbed him and got his DNA under her nails. 
However, the State suggests that "Dr. Roberts' testimony does not come close to 
supporting" an inference that the victim, Mary Vanderford, scratched her attacker. State's Brief 
at 18. Instead the State urges that "putting one's hands 'up' to defend against an attacker is in 
stark contrast to actually scratching the attacker such that DNA would be collected under Mary's 
fingernails." Id. "At best," the State concludes, "the testimony establishes the knife [the 
attacker] used touched Mary's hands, not that her fingernails scratched his skin." Id. The State 
suggests that "it is more probable the DNA was from one of her customers either through direct 
contact, like shaking hands, or some other manner such as the exchange of money." State's Brief 
at 19. This "inference" falls short of the reasonable inference that must be drawn in petitioner's 
favor. 
The State argues that this was "not a sexual assault case where DNA evidence from the 
attacker is sometimes found in fingernail scrapings because of the close proximity of the rapist 
with the victim." Id. This is a case involving close proximity. Examination of the pictures of 
the space where Mrs. Vanderford was killed reveals a narrow space between parallel sets of 
display cases and shelving. See State's [Trial] Exhibits 2,29 and 31, attached as an addendum.6 
6 On State's [Trial] Exhibit 2, the blood locations are solid blue circles, T. Tr. Vol. V, p. 
1305, and the vantage point of the photographs ofthe scene inside the Wishing Well, State's 
[Trial] Exhibits 27-31, are indicated by blue numerals corresponding to the exhibit number, 
paired with an arrow indicating the vantage point of the photographer when each exhibit was 
taken. T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 1292-95, 1302-03. 
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Mrs. Vanderford was murdered in a knife attack, not by a gunshot from a distance outside 
her reach. The defensive cut on Mrs. Vanderford's finger, T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1063, see State's 
[Trial] Ex.ll, is evidence of her struggle within grasping range. Undoubtedly, that is why the 
police in this case obtained and preserved evidence by use of the sexual assault or rape kit, 
notwithstanding the lack of evidence of a rape or sexual assault. Fortunately for Fields, the 
standard rape kit included fingernail scrapings. R. Vol. II, p. 275, CE, Ex. 8 (Affidavit of Pamela 
Marcum In Support of Petitioner's Motion For Access to Evidence, filed September 15, 2005) 
("it was standard practice for a victim's fingernail scrapings to be included in any rape kit," 
including at the time of Mrs. Vanderford's attack, and "[t]hose fingernail scrapings could be 
analyzed for DNA," and this "type of testing was not available in 1988 "). 
In the court below, the State specifically fought to deny access and testing of the sexual 
assault kit. R. 136. Before Fields pointed the State to the sexual assault kit with a specific 
request, the State had denied him access to the fingernail scrapings by stating: "After diligent 
search, the State has been unable to find any evidence that Mrs. Vanderford's fingernails were 
scraped as part of the investigation. If they were, the evidence no longer exists." R.58. Once 
Fields filed Pamela Marcum's affidavit noting that a sex crimes kit was standard procedure in 
1988, the prosecution found the kit in the evidence, and the District Court granted Fields access 
to the kit's samples from the victim. R. 154. The fingernail scrapings were collected with 
toothpicks found inside the rape kit. Transcripts on Appeal, Vol. 5 of 10, Sept. 27, 2005, p. 27. 
The State's suggestion that the fingernail scrapings have not been shown to have come 
from under Mrs. Vanderford's fingernails, State's Brief at 19 ("no evidence establishing how the 
scrapings were retrieved"), defies comprehension. Ifthe State is suggesting that the toothpicks 
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yielding "fingernail scrapings" did not scrape material from underneath Mrs. Vanderford's nails, 
that should be litigated at an evidentiary hearing, as such a practice would defy the standard 
procedures used at the time. 
The State contends that the male DNA more likely came from a handshake or an 
exchange of money with a customer. The more reasonable inference is that the male DNA found 
under Mrs. Vanderford's fingernails is much more likely to be from her attacker. Given the 
defensive cut suffered by Mrs. Vanderford and the ordinary course of handshakes and money 
exchanges, the State's proposed inference that Mrs. Vanderford did not scratch her attacker is 
unreasonable. The likelihood of the source of the DNA should be determined after an 
evidentiary hearing.7 
B. Witness Testimony Strongly Supports Fields' Innocence 
Two sets of witness testimony support Fields' DNA innocence claim. In his Opening 
Brief, Fields recounted the testimony and new affidavits from one set. Two women, Munk and 
Hornecker-Heaton, were in the Wishing Well with Mrs. Vanderford and a lone male for the 15 
minutes before Vanderford was attacked. Opening Brief at 8-11. 
7 In addition to the male DNA found in the fingernail scrapings, three hairs were found on 
Mrs. Vanderford that originated from an unknown man that was not Fields. R. 275, CE, Ex. 9, 
Att. F at 3-4. (Affidavit of Dr. Randell T. Libby). While the origin of these hairs is not known, it 
seems likely that when an attacker confronted and stabbed Mrs. Vanderford, hairs from the 
attacker could have been deposited on her body. The use of hairs from a victim's body to convict 
a person that left the hairs is a commonplace occurrence. The State contends that there is no 
evidence of how these unknown hairs were collected. State's Brief at 19. However, these hairs 
were found on evidence that had been preserved and held by the State, which was examined by 
Fields' counsel and expert at the State's crime lab in Meridian, Idaho while under observation of 
Prosecutor Roger Bourne. See Transcripts on Appeal, Vol. 6 of 10, p.7 (May 5,2006). 
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The State responded that another set of witnesses saw Fields in a nearby retail strip mall, 
the Linda Vista Plaza, also on Fairview Avenue and several blocks from the Wishing Well. 
State's Brief at 15-16,25 (collectively, this set of witnesses will be referred to as "the Linda 
Vista Plaza witnesses"). The Linda Vista Plaza witnesses placed Fields in their respective 
stores, perhaps "a half mile" from the crime, T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1114, within an hour and fifteen 
minutes of the crime. T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 1101, 1127; T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1150. 
Contrary to the State's supposition that placing Fields in the neighborhood establishes his 
guilt, the Linda Vista Plaza witnesses help support Fields' claim of innocence. Mrs. Vanderford 
died from multiple stab wounds to the throat, chest and back. See T. Tr. Vol. 5, 1059-61; State's 
[Trial] Ex. 10. None of the Linda Vista Plaza witnesses mentioned Fields having any blood on 
him. See T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 1096-1147 (testimony of Nancy Miller and Vicki Tippetts); T. Tr. 
Vol. 6, pp. 1148-88 (testimony of Robert Starbard and Timothy McWilliams). In omitting any 
mention of blood on Fields, the testimony of the Linda Vista Plaza witnesses supports Fields' 
innocence, not his guilt. 
In addition to their failure to observe any blood on Fields, as set forth infra, the Linda 
Vista Plaza witnesses confirm that Fields looks nothing like the actual murderer - the man who 
was in the Wishing Well with Munk and Homecker-Heaton until they left him alone with Mrs. 
Vanderford, just moments before the attack. 
Fields' proffered affidavits from Munk and Homecker-Heaton highlight the weakness of 
the State's case against Fields. The State is correct that much in their affidavits recounts facts to 
which they testified at trial. However, that evidence is important and properly before the Court 
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because under section 19-4902(e) Fields' innocence must be evaluated in light of all admissible 
evidence. Their trial testimony was obviously admissible. 
The man that Munk and Hornecker-Heaton observed in the Wishing Well did not look 
like Fields. On the day after the murder Hornecker-Heaton went to the police station and helped 
create a composite sketch of the man she and Munk saw in the Wishing Well. T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 
936-37. That representation of the man is State's [Trial] Exhibit 5. Id. Detective Smith and 
Lieutenant Wallace acknowledged that the composite sketch of the suspect was distributed to the 
media, released to the public and broadcast throughout the state and country. T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 
*w· -. .".. ".. • 
E • L • 
1327, Vol. 7, p. 1380. The composite sketch included a 
. --j 
j detailed description of the man seen inside the Wishing Well 
at around 11 :20 a.m. on February 11, 1988 and indicated that 
he was wanted for questioning by the police. State's [Trial] 
Ex. 5. The "Physical Description" was of a "White male - 48 
years - 6'4" - 220# [pounds] - bald on top w/dark brown hair 
on the sides, smooth skinned - no facial hair." Id. The 
. -t, composite sketch noted that the subject was wearing a "Blue 
Composite sketch from Defense Ex . .'i 
sweatshirt with a zippered front." Id. 
At trial, Hornecker-Heaton described the man she saw as follows: "white," "balding," 
"approximately six foot four" (taller than her six foot two inch husband), wearing a navy blue, 
zip-front, hooded sweat shirt. T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 954-55. He weighed 230 to 240 pounds. Id., p. 
932. The man had dark, brownish hair above his ears. Id., p. 933. He was approximately 48 
years old. T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 957. The man in the Wishing Well was not wearing an orange or red 
18 
camouflaged parka. !d., p. 965. In her only correction to the original description, she stated that 
the composite, State's Ex. 5, did not depict the fullness of his face. T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 956-57. 
The face should have been fuller, the eyes weren't as intense. !d., p. 937. 
Munk described the suspicious man in the Wishing Well as a big man, "about 230 
pounds, over six feet, and about 48 years old," with "grubby, sloppy, dark" clothing. T. Tr. Vol. 
5, p. 971. Her best estimate of his height was over six foot and "under six-three." !d., p. 986. 
Munk was certain the man was not wearing orange or red clothing. !d., p. 987. 
The report from Fields arrest on February 22, 1988 at Shopko provides the following 
objective information. He was 29 years old, five feet eleven inches tall and 200 pounds. Eleven 
days after the Wishing Well murder, he had long, straight brown hair. R. 275, CE, Ex. 1, Att. I 
(last two pages of exhibit, "long" and "straight" hair descriptions come from checked boxes on 
last page). In terms of physical stature, age, hair and clothing, Fields isn't remotely similar to the 
man that Munk and Homecker-Heaton described, notwithstanding the State's disingenuous 
characterization ofHomecker-Heaton's description of the man in the Wishing Well as one that 
"fit Fields' general description." State's Brief at 15. 
On February 22, 1988, Detective Wallace took a picture of Fields, State's [Trial] Ex. 9, at 
the Boise Police Department. T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1322. The picture of Fields that was used in line-
ups shown to witnesses was presumably the mug shot taken the same day, as he appears to be 
wearing the same shirt. See State's [Trial] Ex. 8 (Fields is upper right picture); State's [Trial] 
Ex. 17 (Fields is lower left picture)[both exhibits are included in the addendum to this brief]. 
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Here is what Fields looked like 11 days after the Wishing Well murder: 
Line-up picture. State's Ex. 17 In the detectives' otlices. State's Ex.\.) 
As can be seen by these pictures, Fields had long shaggy hair. He was not "bald on top" 
and did not have short dark hair above the ears, like the man in the composite. See State's [Trial] 
Ex. 5. 
The Linda Vista Plaza witnesses testified to the appearance of a man in their stores who 
was either actually identified as Fields or looked like him. Those witnesses are Nancy Miller of 
Quilt Crossing, Vicki Tippetts ofT-Shirts Plus, and Robert Starbard and Timothy McWilliams of 
Videon. All of these witnesses testified that the man appeared in their store at around 12:30 p.m 
on February 11, 1988, a little over an hour after Mrs. Vanderford was atttacked. See T. Tr. Vol. 
5, p. 1101, 1127,Id., Vol. 6, p. 1150. 
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The Quilt Crossing store was in Linda Vista Plaza on Fairview A venue at the comer of 
Liberty Avenue. T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1097. The Wishing Well was at 6805 Fairview Avenue. T. Tr. 
Vol. 5, pp. 997-98. Nancy Miller of Quilt Crossing stated that the Wishing Well was perhaps a 
half a mile from her store at the comer of Fairview and Allumbaugh. !d., p. 1114. 
Miller identified Fields as having come into the Quilt Crossing. !d., p. 1106-07. She 
described him as having "strawberry blond" hair that was "wild and bushy." Id., p. 1103. He 
was six feet tall and between 25 and 30 years old.8 Id., p. 1103-04. He was wearing an orange 
coat, id., p. 1104, and the coat was solid orange and didn't have camouflage markings. Id., p. 
1109-10.9 
Another Linda Vista Plaza merchant, Vicki Tippetts, identified Fields as being in her 
store, T-Shirts Plus. T. TR. Vol. 5, p. 1135. She described Fields as five feet, ten inches to six 
feet tall, 230 pounds, with "shoulder length hair," that was "dishwater blond" in color and "very 
stringy." Id., p. 1132. His hair was "dirty, scraggly," "over the collar," wasn't "flat," had "some 
fullness to it," and could not have been brown. Id., p. 1144-45. Fields was wearing a dark 
orange or red jacket, id., p. 1132, but it was not a camouflage jacket. Id., p. 1136. 
8 Miller also described Fields as being 250 to 260 pounds, T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1103-04, but 
when Fields was asked to stand up in the courtroom, she said that Fields looked like he weighed 
250 to 260. !d., p. 1107. However, Fields' arrest record showed him to be 200 pounds. 
9 The State claims that Fields was seen with a knife at the Quilt Crossing. State's Brief at 
15. The State mis-states the record. Neither Nancy Miller, nor Vicki Tippetts at T-Shirts Plus 
saw Fields with a knife. Both described seeing a wooden handle, which they assumed was part 
of a knife, but both acknowledged they didn't see anything but a wooden handle. T. Tr. Vol. 5, 
pp. 1105, 1131-32. Robert Starbard never saw anything sticking out of Fields' pocket. !d., p. 
1176. McWilliams didn't mention any handle, knife or pockets at all. 
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Another Linda Vista Plaza sales clerk, Robert Starbard, identified Fields as being in his 
store, Videon. T. Tr. Vol 6, p. 1161. He described Fields as being five feet nine inches to six 
feet tall, id., p. 1154, though he originally testified to an upper limit of five feet ten inches tall. 
Id., p. 1164-65. He thought Fields probably weighed 200 pounds. !d., p. 1154. Fields had long 
sideburns and "dishwater blond" hair, id., that was "very messed up," "over the ear" and reached 
to "the bottom of the neck in back." !d., p. 1166-67. Fields was wearing a reddish orange to red, 
puffy, down-filled coat. !d., p. 1169-70. Neither the camouflage coat pictured in Exhibit 18 nor 
the actual coat itself, which is Exhibit 22,10 is the coat that Fields was wearing while in the 
Videon store. Id., p. 1155, 1171-72. Significantly, the camouflage coat, State's [Trial] Ex. 18, 
cannot be what Fields was wearing, because the coat Fields wore at Linda Vista Plaza did not 
have a hood, whereas the camouflage coat did. See T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1167-68 (no hood). 
Another Videon employee, Timothy McWilliams, observed the same individual, but was 
unable to positively identify Fields. !d., p. 1187. McWilliams described the man as "six feet," 
blond, and wearing an orange jacket without any markings. Id., p. 1183. 
The description of the coat Fields wore that day establishes more than consistency among 
the Linda Vista Plaza witnesses. It directly contradicts testimony by Keith Edson that Fields was 
wearing a camouflage coat. See T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1218, 1224. As with virtually every aspect of 
Edson's testimony, see Opening Brief at 17-18, his observation of Fields' coat is completely at 
odds with all other witnesses in the case. The Linda Vista Plaza witnesses uniformly 
contradicted Edson's assertion that Fields was wearing a camouflage coat that day. Further, 
10 Exhibit 22 is the coat that Fields wore when he was arrested in the Shopko incident. [cite] 
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Edson's description is not remotely similar to that ofMunk and Homecker-Heaton: a man 
wearing a navy blue, zip-front sweatshirt. 
The description of Fields by the Linda Vista Plaza witnesses cannot be reconciled with 
the man that Munk and Homecker-Heaton saw in the Wishing Well moments before Mrs. 
Vanderford's murder: a 48 year old man who was bald, had short-dark-brown-hair-on-the-sides, 
no facial hair, weighed 230 to 240 pounds, and was six feet four or "over six feet and under six 
three," and was wearing a zip-front solid navy blue, hooded sweatshirt. When Munk and 
Homecker-Heaton's descriptions of the man they saw in the Wishing Well are contrasted to both 
the descriptions of Zane Fields by the Linda Vista Plaza witnesses, and the police report from 
Fields' arrest in the Shopko case, 11 days after the murder, it is apparent that Fields was not the 
man who murdered Mrs. Vanderford. 
New evidence has been introduced through affidavits executed by Munk and Homecker-
Heaton. That new material evidence of Fields' innocence should be evaluated at an evidentiary 
hearing along with the DNA evidence and all ofthe admissible evidence. 
Betty Homecker-Heaton's affidavit brought forth the following new facts: 
• After selecting a man's photograph that looked like the large man she had seen in 
the Wishing Well, the police told her that the man she selected had an alibi. R. 
223, ~ 17. 
• That photograph [which was State's [Trial] Ex. 6] failed to capture the look of the 
man she saw in the Wishing Well only to the extent that the man in the store did 
not have glasses or a mustache. Id. 
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• On the day after her trip to the Wishing Well, February 12, 1988, and after her 
second trip to the police station on February 19, 1988, Homecker-Heaton made 
notes about her experience at the Wishing Well and those notes were attached to 
her affidavit as Ex. C. II R. 223, ~ 18. 
• Fields did not look like the man she saw in the Wishing Well shortly before the 
murder. R. 223, ~22. 
• The pictures in the line-up she saw at trial look nowhere near as close to the man 
she saw at the Wishing Well as did the photograph that she picked out at the 
police station. !d. 
• Fields did not look like any of the men she saw at the Wishing Well. 12 R. 223, ~ 
23. 
The State suggests that Homecker-Heaton's affidavit is less credible than her trial 
testimony because the exhibits to the affidavit were inadvertently omitted from the district court 
record. State's Brief at 22. The affidavit, with its accompanying exhibits, was also filed in 
II The exhibits to Homecker-Heaton's affidavit do not seem to have been made part of the 
record. Fields requests this Court take judicial notice of a copy of Homecker-Heaton's affidavit 
that was submitted to the federal court in Fields' habeas corpus proceedings, as that copy ofthe 
affidavit includes its accompanying exhibits. Fields v. Klauser, USDC No. 95-422-S-EJL, 
Affidavit of Betty Heaton, Dkt. 180-2 (D. Idaho Dec. 12,2005). 
All affidavit exhibits except Homecker-Heaton's notes are easily identified elsewhere in 
the existing record. Since her notes are not evident in the record, judicial notice of the federal 
court filing is appropriate. 
12 Homecker-Heaton saw three men. As she entered the store, Homecker-Heaton saw a 
man outside the store washing windows. T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 928. Shortly after her arrival inside the 
store, a man who was already there left. !d. The third man that Homecker-Heaton saw, who 
entered the store while she was there, id., is the large suspicious man who remained in the store 
with Mrs. Vanderford when Homecker-Heaton left. Id., p. 930. 
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federal court, and this Court can take judicial notice of it. See supra note 11. Moreover, three of 
the four exhibits are easily identifiable and are in the current record. Affidavit Exhibit A is the 
composite sketch of the suspicious man at the Wishing Well that she made with the assistance of 
the police. R. 222, ~ 16. That composite sketch was State's Exhibit 5 at trial. See T. Tr. Vol. 5, 
p. 936. Affidavit Exhibit B is the picture she picked out from photos at the police station. R. 
223, ~ 17. That photo was State's Exhibit 6 at trial. T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 958-59. Affidavit Exhibit 
D are the pictures she saw in a photo line-up at trial. R. 223, ~22. That photo line-up was State's 
Exhibit 8 at trial. T. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 938. The only missing exhibit is Homecker-Heaton's 
handwritten notes. 
Mari Munk testified to the following new facts in her affidavit: 
• As she entered the Wishing Well, she passed a woman coming out. R. 225, ~ 3. 
• She "glanced at" the suspicious man, "although I did not get a very good look at 
his face." R. 225, ~4. 
• Fields did not look like the man she saw in the Wishing Well. R. 226, ~ 12. 
• The only photos she recalls seeing appeared in the newspaper. R. 226, ~ 13. 
• The picture of Weaver, State's Ex. 6, [which is the picture that Homecker-Heaton 
identified at the police station as looking like the man she saw in the Wishing 
Well] looks much more like the man Munk saw in the Wishing Well than does 
Fields. R. 226, ~ 14. 
Munk and Homecker-Heaton agreed that the man pictured in State's [Trial] Exhibit 6, 
looked much more like the man they saw in the Wishing Well. Homecker-Heaton stated that his 
picture, minus the glasses and mustache, was the closest photo she saw to the man in the Wishing 
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Well. Further, when one ignores his glasses and mustache as Hornecker-Heaton instructed, the 
man looks much more like the composite sketch than does Fields or anyone in the police photo 
line-ups. 
ri' • I • . , I'OJ '''i, . -------.. r ."._ .. I 
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Given the trial evidence, together with the DNA evidence and additional statements by 
Hornecker-Heaton and Munk that Fields did not look like the man they saw in the Wishing Well, 
it is clear Fields was not the man in the store who attacked and killed Mrs. Vanderford. 
Summary dismissal was inappropriate. The district court should have held an evidentiary to fully 
develop the record and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the new 
evidence. Reasonable inferences from the new evidence, together with all admissible evidence 
would not lead any reasonable juror to convict Fields. 
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c. When Questioned by Police, Fields Did Not React Like a Guilty Person 
Almost immediately after Fields' Shopko arrest, the police focused on him as a suspect in 
the Wishing Well homicide. See Supplemental Report by Detective Anderson dated Feb. 29, 
1988, pp. 1- 5, (hereinafter "Anderson Supp. Rpt. If), attached to Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report (part of the Record on Appeal, filed under seal, in underlying criminal case) (hereinafter 
"PSR"). On February 24, 1988, Detectives Smith and Anderson interviewed Fields about the 
Wishing Well homicide, and Fields denied any participation. Anderson Supp. Rpt., p.4, attached 
to PSR. Fields had been interrogated by Detective Wallace earlier, date unspecified, and had also 
denied any involvement then. !d. This focus on Fields for the homicide case occurred while he 
was in pre-trial detention for the Shopko case. See T. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 1430-31. 
Fields agreed to talk to the police about the Wishing Well murder and signed a waiver of 
his rights. Id. He consented to a search of his residence. !d. He offered to "take a polygraph 
examination to further clear himself of any involvement in the homicide." !d. 
While in detention and housed with Acheson, Fields knew the police were trying to make 
a case against him for the Wishing Well homicide. Anderson Supp. Rpt., p.4, attached to PSR. 
Given that context, reacting as he did to the "Crime Stoppers" announcement on the Wishing 
Well murder - turning down the volume, changing the channel - and reacting angrily to the ads 
and to police efforts to "pin" an unwarranted murder charge on him are more like the 
protestations of an innocent man than the furtive attempt of a guilty one trying to distance 
himself from the crime. 
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D. The Inmate Informants Are Highly Unreliable 
The case against Fields was bereft of physical evidence and relied almost entirely upon 
inmate informant testimony to the effect that Fields confessed to the crime more than a year later, 
while in prison. New evidence establishes that the inmate snitch witnesses were housed together, 
discussed their proposed testimony with each other, and admitted that they were making up their 
stories that implicated Fields. In a case as thin as this one, with the informant inmates playing a 
critically important role as the only direct evidence against Fields, new evidence showing the 
unreliability of those informant inmates removes the only basis upon which reasonable jurors 
could return a guilty verdict. 
Witness Jeff Acheson states in his affidavit: 
I thought it was weird that the police would allow us, the (4) people/inmates 
testifying in the trial to be house[ d] in the same cell together prior to trial, and also 
during the trial. During this time, we would all stay up late and talk about the trial 
and what we each testified about, or what we were going to say when we got up 
on stand. 
Affidavit of Jeff Acheson, R. 275, CE, Ex. 9, Att. D. "Also, the other state witnesses, Howie 
G[ilchrist], Joe H[ eistand], and Scott Bianchi told me of how they had made up most of what 
they were saying, in order to get out of Orofino." Id. Acheson's affidavit is strikingly similar to 
the testimony of Salvador Martinez. Martinez exposed the conspiracy of inmate snitches to 
testify falsely against Fields. T. Tr. Vol 8, pp. 1720-21 (Bianchi and Heistand admitted to 
Martinez that they made up their testimony); id., pp. 1732-33 (the inmate informants admitted to 
Martinez that their testimony "was all a bunch of lies"). 
One of the inmate informants, Scott Bianchi must be regarded as questionable at best. 
Bianchi has recanted his testimony only to later retract the recantation. See Supplemental Trial 
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Clerk's Record, pp. 5-21. Moreover, Bianchi couldn't get the story straight at trial. According to 
Bianchi, Fields said he killed Mrs. Vanderford in Linda Vista Plaza. T. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 1569. 
Bianchi repeated that testimony on cross examination. When asked ifhe was sure that Fields 
said the murder occurred at the at Linda Vista Plaza, Bianchi responded "I'm certain about that." 
T. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 1613. Linda Vista Plaza is not the location of the Wishing Well. The Wishing 
Well was about a half mile from Linda Vista Plaza. See supra at 21. Bianchi's invocation ofthe 
unrelated Linda Vista Plaza lends support to the position that the inmate informants made up 
their stories from information fed them by the police and the other informant witnesses. 
Informant "Turkey" Joe Heistand repeatedly stated that Fields told him that the Wishing 
Well cash register was in the back ofthe store. T. Tr. Vol. 7, p. 1480 ("went to the back of the 
store where the till area was and was getting the money"); id., p. 1519 (Fields said the till was in 
the back ofthe store, not the front of the store); id., p. 1520 (Fields didn't say the till was in the 
side counter, he said he went to the back of the store). In fact, the cash register is in the front of 
the store, near the front door. See T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1299 (cash register is where the diagonal 
marks are on the diagram that is State's [Trial] Ex. 2); State's [Trial] Ex. 2 (cash register 
indicated by diagonal marks in counter near front of store). See also State's [Trial] Exs. 29, 31 
(drawer open and key hanging out per testimony of Detective Wallace, T. Tr. Vol 6, p. 1319). 
New corroborating evidence establishes that the inmate informants were making up their 
stories - and with the assistance from the police themselves, infra at 30-31, who provided 
information about the crime. Combined with the significant errors in inmate informant testimony 
at trial, the trial testimony of inmates Heistand, Bianchi and Acheson would not be believed by a 
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reasonable juror evaluating the DNA evidence and other new evidence, all of which points to 
Fields' innocence. 
E. Evidence Tainted by Police Coaching Eliminates All Confidence in the Jury's 
Verdict and Further Points to Fields' Innocence 
New evidence also establishes gross police misconduct in providing information to 
inmate informant Jeff Acheson. In a case built almost entirely on informant testimony, 
disturbing examples of police willingness to coach witnesses casts further doubt on the reliability 
of the verdict and supports Fields' claim of innocence. 
Jeff Acheson's affidavit contains the most blatant example of improper conduct. R. 275, 
CE, Ex. 9, Att. D. Acheson states that: 
Id. 
When I told the investigators about how I thought that Zane said that he had 
tossed the "Gun" into the construction site, I was corrected by the investigators as 
to the fact that it was not a gun but a knife that was used to do the murder. I never 
had this information until the police told me. 
When Fields related that he disposed of the "gun" in the "construction site," he plainly 
was discussing the weapon in the Shopko case. Cf State v. Fields, 115 Idaho 1101, 1102, 772 
P.2d 739, 740 (Idaho ct. App. 1989)("suspect [Fields] fled to a nearby area where another store 
was then under construction" and police did not recover the gun that suspect had brandished, but 
"did recover a gun holster and ammunition from the construction site"). The investigating 
officer's "correction" of Acheson on this point led to the jury receiving inaccurate information 
that wrongly implicated Fields in the murder. More significantly, the investigating officer's 
"correction" establishes that the police were willing to supply information to inmate informant 
witnesses in order to obtain Fields' conviction for the unsolved Wishing Well murder. 
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Testimony from Salvador Martinez corroborated this misconduct and corruption ofthe 
system. Martinez stated that the police were "schooling" the inmate informants on the facts of 
the case. T. Tr. Vol. 8, pp. 1727-28. Informant Scott Bianchi told Martinez that Detective Smith 
was talking to inmates and "telling [them] exact facts of cases." T. Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1727-28. 
Bianchi said Smith was telling "Turkey" [Joe Heistand] and Gilchrist, too. Gilchrist admitted to 
Martinez that Detective Smith "was tutoring us this long." T. Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1733-34. 
Keith Edson also appears to have been coached by the police to change his story. Edson 
made a written statement on the day he spoke to the detectives within a couple of days of Fields' 
arrest on February 22, 1988 for the Shopko incident. T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1246. In that statement, 
Edson wrote that "[o]n the day or day after the stabing (sic) at the wishwell, (sic) I was standing 
in the old Boise cascade parking lot." See State's [Trial] Ex. 23. At trial, Edson changed his 
story and claimed that he was definitely present on the day of the murder. T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1194, 
1247-49. Asked what caused him to change his story, Edson answered, "going over what I saw 
that day with the detectives." T. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 1249. 
The State argues that Fields ignores inmates able to recount information not disclosed to 
the media or public, the amount of money taken from the Wishing Well. State's Brief at 25. 
Relating "non-public" information is unremarkable, however, once one understands that the 
police were feeding information about the crime to the informant witnesses. The fact that the 
informants testified that the murder at the Wishing Well involved a robbery of about $50 is no 
longer compelling evidence of Fields' guilt. 
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F. The "Blood" Evidence on Fields' Jacket is Unworthy of Any Weight 
The State argues that "Fields conspicuously ignores significant pieces of evidence such as 
Ann Bradley's finding of blood on his jacket." State's Brief at 25. Bradley's trial testimony was 
equivocal at best and did not merit any response. Since the State has chosen to elevate Bradley's 
findings to "significant" in this Court, Fields will address them with the State's own concessions 
below. 
Bradley's finding of "blood" was on a presumptive test, not a definitive test. "[M]y 
preliminary screening test for the possible presence of blood gave me a positive result." T. Tr. 
Vol. 7, p. 1410 (emphasis added). However, the possibility raised by the presumptive test was 
not confirmed: "my tests for human origin failed to produce any positive result." !d. The 
substances Bradley found on the camouflage jacket "certainly could have" been animal blood, T. 
Tr. Vol. 7, p. 1413, which would be completelyunsurprising since a camouflage jacket would be 
used for hunting. 
In the district court, prosecutor Bourne characterized the trial testimony of the purported 
blood on the camouflage coat as follows: "The jury was never given any reason to believe that 
the sample was the victim's blood to begin with." R. 82 (State's Response to Motion for 
Independent Scientific Testing at 3). Similarly, "the jury was told in unmistakable terms that the 
State Laboratory could not say that the blood stains were human." R. 54 (State's Response to the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing at 3). Given the facts and the State's concessions, 
the purported finding of "blood" on Fields' jacket is of no significance. The State's reliance 
upon such an empty, meaningless "finding" only undermines the State's case, underscores the 
weakness of the physical evidence and could result in the execution of an innocent man. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Credible new evidence establishes Fields' innocence in this case. DNA test results show 
that male DNA in the victim's fingernail scrapings and three hairs found on her body all came 
from someone other than Fields. Fields has shown that evidence against him was concocted and 
unreliable, and that the police fed incriminating evidence to convicted felons who were the only 
significant witnesses against Fields at trial. Betty Hornecker-Heaton and Mari Munk, on the 
other hand, offer strong eyewitness testimony of a perpetrator who wasn't Fields. They 
affirmatively state that Fields did not look like the man they saw in the Wishing Well moments 
before the murder. The district court relied on erroneous logic in concluding that Fields' new 
DNA evidence was of no import because Fields wasn't scratched. To correct that error and to 
allow Fields the opportunity to establish his innocence at a hearing in the district court, this Court 
should reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2010. 
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This subject was in the Wishing Well Gift Shop 
prior to or d,uring the robbery/murder of Kay Vanderford 
on 2-11-88 around 11:20 a.m. 
He is being sought by Boise Police for questioning. 
If you know of this subject, call Boise Police at: 
377-6790 
Physical Description: White male,- 48 years ~ 
6'4" - 220ft - bald on top w/dark brown 
hair on the sides, smooth skinned _ 
no facial hair. 
Possibly wearing: Blue sweatshirt with a zippered 
front - revealing a w]ute or grey shirt 
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For the convience of the court the exhibit sticker from the back of the exhibit has been 
copied to the front. 

